Long-Form Written Samples
Three essays from UBC philosophy coursework — included as writing samples rather than economics work, to show range.
George Berkeley's Immaterialism
Summary: Essay 1 examines George Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, focusing on Berkeley's argument that nothing can exist outside of perception. Through Philonous, Berkeley challenges the concept of matter by showing that inconceivable things cannot exist. The essay traces how this leads to Berkeley's immaterialism and ultimately his claim that all knowledge and perception are caused directly by God. I wrote this essay I 2024 for a philosophy of the 18th century class.
The crucial point of George Berkeley's "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous" is the argument against the existence of objects outside of perception. The main speaker of the dialogue, Philonous (hereafter Phil), presses his interlocutor, Hyles (hereafter Hyl), to give an account of what makes up the substance of the external world if it exists that is independent from perceptions and ideas which only exist in the mind. Hyl attempts to argue that the external world exists and is made of matter, but cannot give an account of what matter is. After trying, but failing to describe a clear conception of matter, Hyl attempts to point out that the conceivability of a thing has no necessary connection to that thing's existence. Phil does not concede this point, arguing that something's existence is possible only by it being positively known, and if a thing is knowable, it must also necessarily be conceivable, so the inconceivability of a thing necessarily means that it cannot exist. This entails that things cannot exist outside of the mind.
Phil bases his argument on an appeal to common conditions, stating that any positive claim should satisfy conditions agreed upon in both ordinary and philosophical terms to support his claim that the inconceivability of something disproves its existence. While Phil permits that the existence of something that is not immediately perceived can be inferred by reason, even without a positive notion of that thing, the existence of something cannot be meaningfully stated if no clear, non-abstract perceptions or ideas can be attributed to that thing, or if reason does not support that thing's existence. For a thing's existence to be either reasoned for or perceived, that thing must necessarily be conceivable by having clear ideas attached to it. So while a thing can be conceived without necessarily existing, if a thing exists, it must necessarily be conceivable.
All conceivable things can possibly exist, but the possibility of existence is not sufficient for a thing to exist. If claims of existence were not supported by reason or perception, there would be no way of discriminating between existent and non-existent things, and all conceivable things would all be equally real. If conceivable things, that have the potential to be known to exist, do not exist, then something that is not even knowable and conceivable certainly cannot exist. Phil continues that, for these reasons, the argument Hyl presents does not have any meaningful content, and because Hyl makes a meaningless argument, no meaningful conclusion concerning a positive reality of matter has any grounds to be drawn.
The conditions Phil places on what can be reasonably argued to exist extend beyond their logical and epistemological context to a metaphysical context. Because all that is outside of the mind is not conceivable, by not having any relation to the mind's qualities of reason and perception, if there were things outside the mind, they could not have any support to their reality. Reality is supported only by a mind's ability to perceive it, so the restrictions of the mind are restrictions on reality itself. Consequently, things can only possibly exist insofar as they exist in the mind. Consequently, any epistemological conditions concerning what a mind can know extend to what can actually exist, so that if there were only one mind, all that could be would be the contents of that mind. Things can exist only insofar as they can be perceived, remembered, or known through reason.
Phil's conclusion that the inconceivability of a thing is sufficient to conclude its non-existence entails that the process of acquiring new knowledge is radically different from how it may normally be understood. The acquisition of new knowledge and conceptions is commonly understood as the discovery of a phenomenon that already exists in the world or logical space. However, since Phil denies the existence of an external world, new knowledge and conceptions must emerge within the mind through an entirely different process. Without some account as to how new conceptions enter the mind that is not more compelling than the alternative, that conceptions originate in the external world, Phil's account up to this point will be easily dismissable. Further metaphysical steps must be taken to find the source of knowledge.
The solution that Phil concludes is that knowledge enters the mind through divine revelation. God directly brings an object of knowing to the perception of a mind, thereby the mind can know that thing. Knowledge is not discovered but rather bestowed on an individual by God. For Phil, this is both a natural conclusion given his belief in the existence of an all-powerful God, but also support for the existence of God, as no other thing can be deduced to cause our perceptions. Phil argues that, since God causes all things, God must also cause all perceptions directly, without relying on the external world as a medium. Therefore, perceptions can serve as the foundation of all knowledge, as they can be transformed into ideas and combined with other God-given qualities, such as reason, to form new concepts. Granting the existence of God also has the consequence of all things existing by their constantly being perceived by God, so that there is continuous existence of things, apart from fleeting perceptions passing between mortal minds. Allowing objects to subsist without the immediate knowledge of the minds surrounding these objects.
The notions, however, may be difficult for many to accept, for those who do not believe in God, but also have several consequences that are difficult to accept, even with belief in God. There are problems about the nature of God, like 'why would God impose perceptions that lead to false ideas?' Theological questions like these do not have satisfying answers in the immediate philosophical context of "Three Dialogues", and transform what are conventionally considered epistemological problems into theological ones. Further issues stem from Phil's arguments for the existence of God being circular. They largely originate from his arguments for immaterialism, which in turn are dependent on God. An example is Phil's argument that God bestows perceptions onto minds, explaining how perception can originate without a material world, and then justifying the existence of God by his necessity in causing perception.
Thus, the refutation of Hyl's remark has instantiations that run through the whole of Berkeley's "Three Dialogues". The rebuttal to Hyl's claim is a substantial application of Berkeley's idealism and immaterialism, and demands that many of the same arguments in support of Berkeley's philosophical system be employed to give the full case against Hyl's position of materialism when he claims that inconceivability does entail non-existence. The existence of something is possible only by that thing being conceivable, because if a thing is inconceivable, it is also unknowable, so it cannot exist in a mind, and things can exist only insofar as they do in a mind. The ways in which things can be decided to exist, or not exist, are entirely within the mind, so that discussion of existence independent of the mind is both without meaning, and the conclusion that things exist independent of the mind is impossible.
The Consequences of Habit in Hume's Enquiry
The Consequences of Habit, on the Justified True Belief Theory of Knowledge, in David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Summary: David Hume's Enquiry on Human Understanding argues that beliefs arise not through reason but through habit, formed by repeated experiences that create associations in the mind. Inductive reasoning, which underlies even complex thought, is rooted in these habitual associations and guided by feelings of rightness rather than pure logic. However, Hume's account faces issues, notably its failure to explain how the mind initially organizes experience, or how a priori reasoning might still play a role.
David Hume's "Enquiry on Human Understanding" argues that inferences largely tend to be arrived at by habit rather than a deliberate logical process. For an inference to come from habit, that inference will have been made only based on the thing being inferred, having been observed in experience. It is an ability and tendency to correlate particular and distinct events after observing these events in conjunction repeatedly, so that the occurrence of certain events causes an observer to infer the occurrence of certain others.
An example is, after observing a ball being dropped and bouncing, a person seeing only a ball bouncing, but not that ball being dropped, would infer that that ball had been dropped. This mental process is a habit, because only by observing the dropping and the bounce a few times will the mind associate one event with the other. Once any set of events is coupled in a like way to this, the mind of an observer becomes primed so that when the unique particulars of one of the events are observed, out of habit, the thought of the associated events generally tends to spring to mind. The habit of making associations between things takes the form of expecting an effect or characteristic from a familiar cause or object. After one has observed a ball falling and rebounding upward several times, one comes to expect that, when dropped, the ball will bounce, and anticipate the bounce so vividly that one can't help but anticipate the arc of the bounce. Furthermore, if the ball defies expectation and settles immediately on a solid floor, it will produce an unpleasant and startling effect, despite whether the ball bounces or not, having absolutely no meaningful consequence other than affirming our expectations of it doing so. Furthermore, it is the associations between any characteristics of a thing that construct our conceptions of what objects are. An object is nothing more than a collection of occurrences that are expected to occur together, like the qualities of colour and heft, which, when bundled together, are referred to by a name.
Correlations drawn from particular cases can be further instantiated onto distinct events in a process called induction. Continued keen observation and the accounts of others allow for the identification of increasingly acute categorizations. What follows is that the common characteristics of certain occurrences can be aggregated to produce consistent expected results across phenomena sharing only very few specific characteristics. It is primarily by this process that human minds come to gain information. The process that allows for complex and obscure characteristics of one thing to be linked with another quite distinct, and far-removed thing, is of the same form as that which links simpler phenomena — both are merely inductions of previously perceived patterns. The only difference is that more complex processes, called reason, draw upon more numerous and obscure premises that are less immediately observable, or directly and intuitively linked.
Consequently, many conclusions that have seemingly been arrived at by reason alone are not drastically different from any other form of belief humans come to hold. Few if any claims can have a necessary backing or inherent validity greater than the conclusions drawn more directly from experience. Those beliefs arrived at seemingly apriori only appear to have an indisputable base in axioms and deductions, having their backing entirely in the physical observable world, and so do not rest in some non-physical space. So it is that nearly all human beliefs face the constraints imposed by the fallibility of the senses. By there being largely no apriori beliefs, all beliefs then must be traceable to observation, leaving what is believed to have had to only precariously been arrived at by a particular confluence of events. As the senses are vulnerable to being misled by a variety of tricks and illusions, it follows that beliefs originating in sense are similarly vulnerable. The only indicator left to try to systematically identify true beliefs is the conformity they may share with the majority of past experiences and inductions.
How experiences come to be believed, and determined to conform to other beliefs, is not primarily via mental analysis, but a bodily feeling of rightness that autonomously presents itself. Something is not principally believed because it is induced to be true, but rather because it is felt to be, and despite empirical or rational justifications accompanying believed thoughts, they are secondary to the pure sensation. The fleeting sensation of a ball bouncing is accompanied by a feeling of correctness and satisfaction associated with it conforming to expectation and belief. If the ball fails to bounce, the accompanying sensation is unpleasant, associated with momentary disbelief, as the ball fails to do what we expect. As the processes of expecting a ball to bounce and any other process of induction share the same general form, it can be inferred that it is similar sensations of satisfaction, or startled disappointment, that guide belief even in the most complex and abstract cases.
A notable problem with the position Hume takes in The Enquiry is that the faculty that allows for sensory information to begin to be meaningfully organized is not sufficiently accounted for. The radical empiricism argued for, largely dismisses apriori knowledge and has the fundamental flaw of failing to explain how a mind devoid of any experience can begin to construct an understanding of causality in a meaningful way. The abundance of dynamic phenomena encountered in the world has the potential to pull attention toward any number of things, and without experience, it may be impossible for the mind to begin to focus attention on meaningful objects, where the notion of causality, for example, can begin to be pieced together. If, as Hume allows, instinct guides attention in seeking usable impressions, this implies some component of the mind has an innate ability to recognize causality, to direct attention toward it before experience. This inconsistency leads to major points of Hume's The Enquiry seeming at least incomplete and potentially inconsistent.
There are also issues of ambiguity in his work. There is no clear characterization of what reason is to Hume. Although reason is a process of induction, it is not clear at what point, or which inductive processes are to be considered as reason. Inductive processes, to Hume, include both complex logic and very simple inductions that Hume argues even animals are capable of, despite not being in possession of reason. Even if it is accepted that reason is an inductive process, Hume still does not give adequate delineations as to which inductions can be called reason.
In closing, in David Hume's "Enquiry on Human Understanding," it is argued that beliefs are not arrived at by reason, but rather by the force of habit. Beliefs come about as uniform expectations across similar phenomena, the uniformity of which is only observable by their repeated observation. Through repeated observation, particular phenomena come to be associated. Because it is the product of repetition, belief originates in habit. As all beliefs largely conform to the habitual process of induction, it cannot be a process of reasonable justification that brings about belief. While the theory of the acquisition of belief presented by Hume adequately accounts for large portions of knowledge, it does not plausibly explain the acquisition of early beliefs, and does not adequately allow plausible cases of a priori reasoning to be solutions to these problems.
Plato's Theory of the Forms and the Philosophy of Language
Plato's Theory of the Forms in Their Philosophical Naming and Defining Capacity
Summary: Plato's Theory of the Forms, interpreted through the lens of language, positions Forms as the ideal meanings behind the names used in philosophy. Since philosophy is conducted through language, precise definitions aligned with the Forms are essential for clear and consistent thought. The Socratic method serves to refine these definitions by exposing contradictions and guiding interlocutors toward the truth. Ultimately, Plato presents a vision of language where true understanding depends on how closely one's words reflect the eternal Forms.
Plato's theory of the Forms has been an enduring philosophical concept that has been interpreted in various ways. What makes the idea of the Forms attractive is its versatility. Medieval scholars interpreted the Forms religiously, while modern Platonists loosely grounded the philosophy of Math on them. In this essay, the Forms are interpreted in their applicability to the philosophy of language, presupposing a unitarian perspective, and focusing on the early dialogues. Plato's writing demands that so far as philosophy is expressed in language and philosophical ideas that are named are a part of language, and have corresponding Forms, it must be an object of philosophy to formulate a consistent comprehension of the definitions of these names fundamental to philosophy by an understanding of the Forms corresponding to them. Plato means for the Forms to be philosophical standards of understanding to aspire to, while it is understanding the relationships constituting the Forms and between Forms that are the problems of philosophy.
Philosophy is discussed in language with names. Raphael Demos interprets Plato to understand this, interpreting Plato's meaning of names as follows, "The function of names is to establish distinctions among things according to their nature" (Demos 598). Names constitute the meaningful component of language. "Everything that exists is namable," (Demos 600). Names abbreviate the definition of what things are, names are meaningful. Plato writes that it is not the letters that determine a name, but rather "the intrinsic quality of the thing named"(Plato, Cratylus, 432e, Trans. H.N. Fowler). There is a Form that corresponds to every name. Concepts like justice, beauty, good, or bad can be named, as they are here, and have a corresponding Form (Demos 603). If It is uncertain what definition corresponds to these named Forms, finding out logically is the goal of philosophy.
Forms, in their named use in language, are fundamental to philosophy, although the definitions of such names are not agreed upon, or clear amongst philosophers. Philosophy is conducted principally in language. When one philosophizes their words must be carefully chosen and carefully understood, as their words will carry in them their full weight and possible meanings. Moreover, they ought to attempt to carry the weight of the Form itself. The words that correspond to Forms bridge language to an underlying perfect world that philosophy hopes to comprehend. The Forms play an important role in Plato's and Socrates' argument strategies, as well as in their philosophical orientations apart from debate. They are a tool by which to criticize inconsistency in others' arguments, as well as grounding for a philosopher's thinking. Socrates repeatedly exploits others' poor understanding of the words/names that they try to use. Thus closeness to the true Forms is both the aim and precondition to philosophy. There is no philosophy without precise words and governing rules of language.
Disagreement on what a specific Form is is resolved by the Socratic, dialectic method, which itself is philosophy. A part of the Socratic Method's purpose is to come to the most perfect understanding of the things by the Forms. To understand Forms in some other way is some other method, to understand the Forms related to numbers is math. A more perfect understanding of the Forms is brought about by an ideal debate method, in the sense that no one is trying to win so much as either persuade or be persuaded of the truth. Plato explicitly describes the dialectic method and the Forms used in it, writing that philosophical hypothesis "reverses itself and, keeping hold of what follows from it, comes down to a conclusion, making no use of anything visible at all, but only on forms themselves," (Plato, Republic 6 511c, Trans. C.D.C Reeve).
A clear definition that corresponds as closely as possible to its associated Form is what is important to philosophy. The Form of Justice is important if the philosopher is to imagine what a just society is. A Sophist, in trying to define a thing like justice, may imagine a definition that would warrant contradicting conclusions when it is applied to various situations. Socrates in various dialogues will ask his interlocutors to define a word they use. It's often that his interlocutor will not be able to, or instead provide an example, rather than explaining the thing, or Form itself. Socrates presses on when someone does this, he "forces someone to say what he thinks, i.e., forces him to speak, and tries to derive from that sole speech either inconsistencies or conclusions that the speaker is not ready to endorse."(Wilmet 97).
In Republic One, Socrates's dialogue with Polemarchus immediately gives an example of this feature of the dialogues. Polemarchus argues that justice is to give one what is owed, this being harm to enemies, and goodness to friends (Plato, Republic 1, 332d). However, Socrates points out that the just person in most cases is not the best in doing good to you, as it is often the case that a tradesperson may help you more than a friend in matters regarding their trade. The just person, by Polemarchus's definition, is not good at much, other than when you need someone to trust, but then the just person would be the best person at breaking your trust- an unjust activity (Plato, Republic 1, 334b). Plato, in analyzing Sophists' claims, "tries to show that they are intrinsically incoherent; that is to say, he tries to show that what is proposed and how it is proposed are inconsistent and incompatible" (Wilmet 98). Over the dialogues, Plato guides those he makes discourse with towards a more perfect, consistent use and understanding of the words they use. Plato will often steer a political, or ethical discussion to one about the Forms, which will become his main argument.
Plato treats the world as the imperfect shadow of the perfect world of the Forms. Mathematics and geometric ideas are perfect, but perfect geometric objects like a perfect triangle do not exist in the tangible world. Items in the world do not so much exist themselves, but conform imperfectly to a universal Form that is the epitome of what that thing is. Plato writes, "If there is anything beautiful beside the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than it shares in the Beautiful, and I say so with everything." (Plato, Phaedo, 100c) The form here is the Beautiful while Plato only uses it as an example for all Forms. For Plato, by an understanding of one Form: the Good, which is perfection, the gateway by which to enter into the world of the Forms opens. "The Good is the cause of knowledge and truth in the known, and of being and reality in the knower." (Plato, Republic 6, 508e).
Plato's theory of Forms constitutes a Picture Theory of Language, the term coined by the 20th-century philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. This view presupposes that a true statement accurately describes reality, or corresponds to it, as a picture corresponds to reality.(Mualem 11). Everything in the world corresponds to Forms, thus, a statement is true if it accurately describes the relations Forms take within the world. Plato describes this apparatus when he explains that "everything that is bigger is made bigger by nothing other than Bigness,"(Plato, Phaedo, 101a). If one speaks of something that is bigger than something else, they don't so much speak of that bigger thing as they do the relation between the singular and perfect Forms of Bigness and the Form of that thing which is big. Whether this statement is true or not is dependent on it accurately conveying the way that things are. A meaningful philosophical statement for Plato will not reflect the things in the world of sense, but the items of the world of Forms.
In closing, Plato's theory of the Forms substantially establishes a philosophy giving an orientation to language itself. The Forms demand that the names intended to correspond to them are precisely defined when they are used. If they are not, one risks that their words contradict themselves. If one wants to be able to find the truth, they must do so unobstructed by the senses and by the pure Forms themselves. This is what the philosopher aspires to do. A clear understanding of the Forms is an understanding without contradictions, and hence the truest understanding.
Works Cited
Professor Griffin's class lectures.
Demos, Raphael. "Plato's Philosophy of Language." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 61, no. 20, 1964, pp. 595–610. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2023441. Accessed 24 Nov. 2023.
Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan (trans.), "Parmenides," in J.M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (eds.), Plato: Complete Works, Hackett, 1997. Translation lightly modified for class by Michael Griffin (2020).
Mualem, Shlomy. "Language as Picture in Plato's Cratylus and Wittgenstein's Tractatus." Tópicos, Vol. 33, no. 1, 2013, pp. 9-35, https://doi.org/10.21555/top.v33i1.158. Accessed 9 Dec. 2023.
Plato and C. D. C. Reeve. A Plato Reader: Eight Essential Dialogues. Hackett Pub. Co., 2012.
Plato. "Plato's Cratylus." Translated by David Horan, The Dialogues of Plato, The Foundation for Platonic Studies, 14 Jan. 2023, www.platonicfoundation.org/cratylus/. Accessed 12 Dec. 2023.
Plato. "Plato's Cratylus." Translated by Harold N. Fowler, Plato, Cratylus Page 432. Perseus Digital Library, www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Plat.+Crat.+432. Accessed 12 Dec. 2023.
Pritchard, Timothy. "Is There Something in Common? Forms and the Theory of Word Meaning." European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 25, no. 4, 2017, pp. 1675-1694, https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12253. Accessed 9 Dec. 2023.
Wilmet, Renaut, and Renaud Wilmet. "PLATONIC FORMS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF LANGUAGE." Revue de Philosophie Ancienne, vol. 8, no. 1, 1990, pp. 97–118. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24353891. Accessed 24 Nov. 2023.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Edited by Marc A. Joseph. Translated by C. K. Ogden and Frank Plumpton Ramsey, Broadview Press, 2014.